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• APES Basic Building Blocks for Anonymity
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– Motivation for Evaluation
– Basic Building Blocks
• Example Anonymity System: Pseudo/CoRe
– Motivation for Audit Data Pseudonymization
– Overview Pseudo/CoRe
– Specific Building Block Requirements
• Evaluation of Pseudo/CoRe
– Decomposition
– Building Blocks Used
– Results
• Conclusion
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Anonymity and Privacy in Electronic Services
*
Basic Building Blocks for Anonymity
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APES: Anonymity and Privacy in Electronic Services
• surveys state-of-the-art anonymity systems:
anonymous connections, web browsing, e-mail, e-payments, e-auctions, . . .
• anonymity systems decomposed into reusable basic build blocks
– easier to compare similar building blocks than complex anonymity systems
– can systematically identify deficiencies given list of building blocks
– can design anonymity systems by systematically composing building blocks
here: evaluate design of a given anonymity system:
• decompose into building blocks
• compare building blocks used to all similar building blocks to
goal 1) identify room for improvement
goal 2) identify deficiencies
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The APES Basic Building Blocks Levels
• building blocks hide or remove identifying information at
connection level: provide anonymous communication channels
– information may identify individuals
implicitly: linking information along connection path by
appearance: content, format, size, . . .
flow: exploit knowledge about packet processing: order, timing, . . .
explicitly (appearance): IP address in packet header, . . .
– compose building blocks to change appearance and flow
application level: provide anonymity in an application
– mostly not basic building blocks, rather composed of elementary
building blocks not offering anonymity alone
• need to be combined on both levels to achieve anonymity
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An Example Anonymity System
*
Pseudo/CoRe
Pseudonymization with Conditional Reidentification
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Audit Data Pseudonymization
audit data: (=log data)
• can be used to identify individual persons that use a service:
performance monitoring, activity profiling
conflicting security requirements:
• accountability of misuse to protect victims
• individual desire for and right on anonymity / privacy
balancing conflicting security requirements:
• replace person identifying features in audit data with pseudonyms
• detection of misuse suspicions possible on pseudonymized audit data
• for a given misuse suspicion accountability can be established:
only the involved pseudonyms can be disclosed
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Specific Building Block Requirements
• SSO generally cannot observe user behavior,
exception: inspection of pseudonymized audit data
⇒ no connection-level anonymity required
• channel between audit component and pseudonymizer must be protected,
easiest if channel is short and local, hence
pseudonymize on device providing service and generating audit data
⇒ service responsiveness must not degrade substantially (a)
• device may get successfully hacked, hence
move audit data to a secure location as soon as possible
⇒ pseudonymization must: (b)
– be performed on the fly
– introduce no significant delay
– keep up with audit data volume characteristic for the service
(a) & (b) ⇒ building blocks with low computational complexity and low delay
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Evaluation of Pseudo/CoRe
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Pseudonymization Approach Decomposed
dummy generation
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padding 1 padding 2
secret sharing schemes threshold cryptosystem
reordering
one−way function 1 one−way function 2
dummy updates
encryption 1
audit data
random key
random string
pseudonymizer
pseudonymized audit data pseudonym mapping pseudonymity−layer data
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Connection-Level Building Blocks Used
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Application-Level Building Blocks Used
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Evaluation Results
ad goal 1) identify room for improvement
• in the conceptual design under specific circumstances a more efficient
building block could be used to hide pseudonym mapping updates
• six build blocks could be used to
– reduce the power of the TTP
– replace the threshold cryptosystem
– provide exploitable properties in of protected pseudonymity layer data
• probably none of the candidate building blocks will either satisfy
the specific requirements of audit data pseudonymization wrt.
computational complexity or delay
⇒ improvement possible only if requirements are relaxed to trade off
stronger mechanisms against computational complexity or delay
ad goal 2) identify deficiencies
• none found
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Conclusions About the APES Approach
• it is feasible to decompose the design of a given anonymity system
• informally analyzing the decomposed design can identify
weaknesses and/or room for improvement
• the given building blocks for conditional anonymity were sufficient for
our design; may be sufficient to build many systems for conditional
anonymity
• the classification of building blocks is incomplete
• the list of basic building blocks for anonymity is not exhaustive
⇒ analysis results merely give strong indications based on the current state
of knowledge
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